Managing Director & Founding Partner
Corporate Recovery
Most companies sold in Chapter 11 are sold under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, which lets a debtor sell assets outside the ordinary course of business with the court’s approval. A 363 sale survives an objection when the process behind it was thorough and complete enough that the court can be satisfied the market has spoken, whoever the buyer turns out to be and whatever the market happens to have said.
The thing that makes a sale process survive an objection is thoroughness and completeness. You want to run a transparent process. Every potential bidder gets access to the same information, and nobody is preferred over anybody else. The process is widely publicized. It runs on commonly accepted practices for selling distressed companies, which are mostly the same as those for selling any company. And anybody who might possibly have an interest can get into the process. No artificial hurdles. No contrived reasons a party cannot participate. No special barriers to entry or qualification criteria.
At the end of the day, that is what allows the court to be satisfied that the market has spoken.
What does a marketing process mean in bankruptcy? The same thing it means outside of it. You assemble a data room. You put together materials that describe the company or the assets being sold. Then you go out and publicize it and attract buyers.
The solicitation process is really what separates sale advisory firms from each other. The quality of their Rolodex, the quality of their lists, and their ability to get emails opened by parties who might be interested. In short, their ability to build an audience for the sale and get interested parties into the process.
Once the interested parties are there, they need access to information and access to management for diligence, and there needs to be a clear understanding of what it is that is being sold.
A big plus is a company that has already done the work on a turnaround plan. It can communicate, “This is what the company looks like now, and if you do these four things, this is what it will look like when you are done.” That actually enhances the value of the distressed entity.
It is easy to say as much time as you have is long enough. The reality is that 45 to 60 days has become the sweet spot for an aggressive bankruptcy sale. Anything under 45 days is exceptional, and there need to be circumstances warranting it. A company that comes into bankruptcy already marketed can get a shorter timeline if it needs one. Anything over 60 days starts to look like a healthy M&A process, not a distressed one.
None of that is written in the Code. It is where the practice has landed, and it has landed there for a reason. In bankruptcy, you are dragging a parade of professionals, most of whom are billing hourly. The longer you stay in, the more expensive the process gets, and the more value gets eradicated. There needs to be a cost-benefit analysis that supports going longer than 60 to 90 days at the outside, and lenders are unlikely to pay the cost of a longer bankruptcy case if it isn’t going to result in a better outcome for them
A stalking horse bidder sets the floor for the auction. If somebody outbids it, the break-up fee and expense reimbursement are what it gets for its trouble.
The concept is not the problem. The biggest issue with break-up fees and expense reimbursement is the percentage. The rule of thumb is that you are going to fight an uphill battle to get something approved by the court that is in excess of 3%.
Size cuts both ways. In really small deals you can get a higher percentage, because fewer dollars means a bigger percentage, and the lawyers cost the same whether the company being bought is big or small if it takes the same number of hours. In a giant deal it runs the other way. On a $2 billion or $3 billion sale, a court is probably not going to approve a 3% break-up fee, because that is just a massive windfall.
So you start in the 3% range and adjust up or down, depending on the size of the company and what actual dollar number the break-up fee and expense reimbursement turn into.
The market is going to speak at the end of the day. If there is competition, great. If there is not, and all you have is an insider or sponsor bid, then as long as the process was run properly, if that is the only one who wants the thing, then that is the only one who wants the thing.
There is one condition. There has to be an independent decision-maker on the debtor’s side. You cannot have a sponsor who controls the board deciding to sell the company to itself, or you’ll have a much harder time getting approval. That is where you use independent directors and form a special committee of the board to oversee the bankruptcy case.
(I have written about what happens when an insider sits on both sides of a transaction in Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawsuits: What Actually Exposes the Board of an Insolvent Company.)
In bankruptcy you really only have one shot at attacking a sale, and that is an objection at the sale hearing. The objectors will claim problems with the process. They will claim undue influence by the sponsor or insider who is trying to buy the company.
All of that is easily preventable. Use independent decision-makers. Use an advisor that knows how to run a process. Solicit participation from the potential objectors, and get ahead of the objection that way.
At the end of the day, the court is going to look at what the process was and what options there are, and pick the best outcome. If the process was right, the market has already told the court what that is.
Ted Gavin is the Managing Director and Founding Partner of Gavin/Solmonese. He served as President of the American Bankruptcy Institute from 2018 to 2019. During his presidency, he formed the ABI Task Force on Veterans and Service Members Affairs, which drove the legislative effort behind the HAVEN Act of 2019. He is a Certified Turnaround Professional and Certified Professional Mediator, and has served as plan administrator, fiduciary, expert witness, and restructuring advisor in numerous large and complex bankruptcy cases, including the largest retail liquidation in American history.